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Federal  Regulatory Interests in  Water .
I.	 Introduction
A. Summary
Federal regulatory interest in water confines itself to
three simple areas: Who benefits, Who pays, and Who decides.
This discussion will largely confine itself to portions of one
Western interstate river, the Lower Colorado, from Glen Canyon Dam
to Lake Mead. Our focus will be primarily on the roles of three
Federal resource managers and regulators: the Department of the
Interior, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.
Since the waters of the Colorado River were divided up
between the states in 1922 the management of the river has focused
on meeting the legally defined water delivery requirements and
generating electricity. The uses and abuses of the Colorado River
took a severe twist in 1982, when the Secretary of the Interior
directed that the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies be initiated
to determine scientifically what impact the operations of Glen
Canyon Dam are having on the natural resources downstream, notably
on the Grand Canyon. These studies led to an Environmental
Impact Statement, currently under preparation, and to potential
intermediate changes in flows from the dam, known as "interim
flows".
Herein lies a tale - a work in progress.
B. General References 
Colorado River  Ecology and Dam Management, Proceedings of a
Symposium May 24-25, 1990, Santa Fe, New Mexico. Committee to
Review the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies Water Science and
Technology Board Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and
Resources National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. May, 1991.
Glen  Canyon Environmental Studies Final Report, January 1988
United States Department of the Interior
Glen Canyon Environmental Studies Executive Review 
Committee Final  Report, May 1988 United States Department of the
Interior, Western Area Power Administration, Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Reclamation
River and Dam Management A Review of the Bureau of 
Reclamation's Glen Canyon Environmental Studies, Committee to
Review the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies Water and Science
Technology Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and
Resources National Research Council National Acadmey Press,
Washington, D.C. 1987
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II. The Colorado River
1. Surface Water 
a. The Colorado River winds more than 1400 miles
through the States of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming,
Arizona, Nevada, and California on its way to Mexico and the Sea
of Cortez.
b. The river provides an essential source of water for
the states it drains. Irrigation, municipal and industrial, flood
control, hydroelectric, recreational, fish, wildlife, cultural and
archeologic uses conflict and compete for the limited water.
c. In 1922 the river was allocated (i.e., divided)
between the upper and lower basins through the Colorado River 	
pm
Compact. Hoover Dam was authorized in 1928 (45 stat. 1057) in the
Boulder Canyon Project Act. Dedicated in 1935, it created Lake
Mead.
d. Glen Canyon Dam was one of four major water storage
projects for river regulation and power production, in addition to
11 participating projects for irrigation and related uses author-
ized in 1956 by the Colorado River Storage Act (70 stat. 105).
The purpose of the Colorado River Storage Project (CRS?) was to
develop the water resources of the upper basin. The priority
purposes of Glen Canyon Dam are to 1) Regulate the flow of the
Colorado River; 2) Store water for beneficial consumptive use; 3)
Provide for the reclamation of arid and semiarid land; 4) Control
floods, and 5) Generate hydroelectric power. 	 (Th
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e.	 The Glen Canyon Dam, which began storing water behind it
in 1963, is the key regulatory feature on the Colorado River.
Lake Powell filled for the first time in 1980, 17 years after
storage began. Impacts of the dam are traceable from Lake Powell
to Lake Mead.
f.	 The Lower Colorado River controlled by Glen Canyon
Dam, drains Arizona, Nevada and California. The reach of river
covered in the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies includes the
first 16 miles through Glen Canyon and the next 277 miles through
the Grand Canyon, entering Lake Mead.
III. Law of the River
a. The use of the river has been defined over the years by
a number of Congressional acts, court decisions, treaties, and
compacts known collectively as the "Law of the River".
b. The Law of the River is a study in the law of mass
allocation of surface water between the upper and lower basins,
the U.S., Mexico, and Native American groups. The operating
criteria are not influenced by water quality and environmental
legislation. The criteria provide managerial guidance to assure
that Lake Powell is filled by July 1 of each year, however the Law
of the River has little to do with day to day operations of Glen
Canyon Dam.
c. A brief review of the law of mass allocation appears on
pp. 20-25 of River and Dam Management A Review of the Bureau of
Reclamation's  Glen Canyon Environmental Studies, prepared by the
3
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Committee to Review the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies, Watex
and Science Technology Board, Commission on Physical Sciences,
Mathematics, and Resources, National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, D. C. 1987. These pages are reprinted
as Appendix III.
d. The 1963-64 Supreme Court decision Arizona vs
California had the effect of making the Secretary of the Interior
the Water Master of the Colorado River.
e. The 1968 Colorado River Basin Act (82 stat. 885)
led to development of long-term operating criteria for the
Colorado River, inckuding a five year operating review which is
still conducted without environmental considerations.
IV. How the Glen Canyon Dam Operates 
a. The Bureau of Reclamation operates and manages the dam
on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with
the seven basin states to annually release a minimum of 8.23 maf
from Lake Powell and to equalize storage between Lakes Powell and
Mead. Monthly releases are scheduled to: 1) Meet delivery
requirements, and 2) Avoid floods. Daily releases are scheduled
for meet firm power contracts to provide the ability to maximize
power revenues to repay the costs of the dam and other reclamation
projects in the upper basin. The dam operates within a wide range
of maxima and minima flows, resulting in widely fluctuating flows
which follow peak demands for electricity.
b. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), an agency
of the Department of Energy created in 1977, manages the marketing
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and distribution of the electrical power produced by running
Colorado River water through the Glen canyon Dam, and other dams
on the river.
c. When asked by Fish and Wildlife Service staff at a
technical meeting in Phoenix in April of 1991 who actually
controls the flows of the river from Glen Canyon Dam, Reclamation
staff responded that annual release of 8.23 maf was predicted by
BR, allocated monthly by the Bureau, then turned over to WAPA to
be released through the generators to meet its electrical genera-
tion requirements.
d. The followup question inquired when does the Bureau ask
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service and the Arizona
Game and Fish Department (AZG&F) what their resources need from
release of that water? The response was that the Bureau has
recently begun asking AZG&F, but that neither FWS nor NPS staff
have approached the Bureau to discuss impacts downstream of Glen
Canyon Dam, as these staff have done downstream of other Colorado
River dams.
V.	 Initiation of Glen  Can yon Environmental Studies
a.	 When it became technically apparent in 1977 that
adding additional generators at Glen Canyon Dam could lead to an
increase in the fluctuations of water levels downstream through
the Grand Canyon, tour operators, boatmen, and the general public
became alarmed about the impacts to river trips, trout, endangered
species, recreation, beaches, and other natural resources.
5
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b. Prior to this, in 1974, a coalition of groups brought
suit against the Director of the National Park Service (Grand
Canyon Dorries, Inc., et al. v. Ronald H. Walker, 500 F.2d 588
1974) to try to block fluctuations of the river as being hazardous
to recreation. The Court did not order the Department to comply
with NEPA regarding fluctuating flows, although it found that NEPA
may apply, but that no decision was before it regarding any
decision BR or DOI had made on the matter.
c. In 1975, the generators at Glen Canyon Dam were found to
be nearing the end of their useful machine lives and that rewind-
ing would be necessary. In addition a proposal was put forth to
add generators to Glen Canyon Dam. It was begun in 1976. BR
decided to uprate the eight generators and prepared an Environmen-
tal Assessment, the first NEPA compliance on any aspect of Glen
Canyon Dam. The resulting document led to a Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI). It was completed in 1982. Uprating
began in 1983 and was completed in 1987.
d. To address the environmental •concerns which were voiced
during the NEPA process, BR and DOI staff took up the question of
whether NEPA should be complied with regarding the operations of
the dam. Lacking adequate technical data to make this decision,
the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies (GCES) were initiated. The
Studies began in December of 1982 to address two questions: I)
Are the current operations of the dam, through control of the
flows in the Colorado river, adversely affecting the existing
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river-related environmental and recreational resources of Glen
Canyon and Grand Canyon? and 2) Are there ways td operate the
dam, consistent with Colorado River Storage Project (CRS?) water
delivery requirements, that would protect or enhance the environ-
mental and recreational resources?
e.	 With completion of the generator uprate process, the
powerplant can now release a maximum of 32,200 cfs at full lake
elevation of 3,700 ft. An operational cap of 31,500 cfs has been
placed on the releases until completion of GCES.
VI. Completion Of Phase I of the GCES
a. Between its inception the end of 1982 and when its
Final Report was published in 1987, the first phase of GCES was a
coordinated effort among several Federal, state and private
organizations. Within the Department of the Interior, the NPS,
FWS, and USGS all contributed technically to the studies. The
AZG&F, WAPA, academic institutions, and private consultánts
likewise contributed to the interim and final reports. In
addition, an Executive Review Committee, comprised of federal
managers, functioned to review, criticize and occasionally cheer
on. The National Academy of Sciences was asked to form a Review
Committee in 1986.
b. The Department requested the Water Science and
Technology Board (WSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to
conduct a review of the GCES of the Lower Colorado River for the
Bureau of Reclamation and to provide advice on alternative
operation schemes for the Glen Canyon Dam.
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c. The GCES Committee was directed to 1) Review and advise
on the GCES in progress, and give a general assessment of how
well these activities were achieving their intended goals; 2)
Advise on interpretation of information for impact analysis from
the technical data developed; 3) Provide advice on the process of
identifying the environmental elements for ranking operational
alternatives for Glen Canyon Dam; and 4) Extrapolate from this
case study recommendations to others who may pursue similar
environmental studies in the future.
d. The GCES Final Report and the NAS report contained
findings that stimulated the Department of the Interior to
initiate Phase II. Some of these findings were: 1) Some aspects
of the operation of Glen Canyon Dam have substantial adverse
effects on downstream environmental and recreational resources; 2)
Flood releases cause damage to beaches and terrestrial resources;
3) Under current operations, flood releases will occur in about
one of every four years; 4) Fluctuating releases primarily affect
recreation and aquatic resources; 5) Modified operations could
protect or enhance most resources; and 6) Our understanding of the
relationships between dam operations and downstream resources is
not complete.
VII. Phase It of Glen Canyon Environmental Studies
a.	 In May of 1988, the Executive Review Committee issued
its final report. This group, chaired by BR, was composed of
staff from NPS, FWS, WAPA, and the Office of the Secretary,
Regional Environmental Office, The ERC spent 12 months evaluating
C""\
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the results of the GCES program. Its recommendations concluded
that "there are several areas of the GCES study that need to be
refined and completed before a recommendation on the operation of
Glen Canyon Dam can be made."
b.	 The two specific areas highlighted by the ERC were: 1)
The effects of both low and fluctuating flows on the Grand Canyon
ecosystem, especially on endangered fish species, the trout
fishery and beach aggradation and degradation were not well
documented, and 2) Detailed economic analysis of operational
options. The Secretary incorporated these concerns in a memoran-
dum dated June 16, 1988 to FWS, NPS and BR, which initiated Phase
II of the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies.
VIII. NEPA Compliance - Department of the Interior
a. On July 27, 1989, the Secretary of the Interior
publicly announced preparation of an EIS to analyze the existing
operating criteria of Glen Canyon Dam and to develop a set of
environmental criteria that would be used by the Department during
the development of the Annual Operating Plan for the operation of
Glen Canyon Dam. This has since been amplified and modified in
two subsequent Federal Register notices.
b. The cooperating agencies on this EIS began with FWS,
NPS, WAPA, Regional Environmental Office (DOI), and BIA. Even-
tually the number grew to include Arizona Game and Fish Depart-
ment, U.S. Geological Survey, the Navajo Nation, the Hualapai,
Hopi, and Havasupai tribes. At this writing, three additional
tribes are also requesting or contemplating cooperator status
(Kaibab Paiute, San Juan Southern Paiute and Zuni).
IX. NEPA Compliance - western Area Power Administration
a. WAPA was formed as part of the Department of Energy
Organization Act in August, 1977. WAPA is the power marketing
organization responsible for marketing Federal electric power in
15 Western States. WAPA took over the power marketing duties of
BR via an administrative determination in 1980. (Reclamation
retained the responsibility to regulate and manage the reservoirs
and dams of the Colorado River while WAPA took over the marketing,
contract development and transmittal of power.)
b. WAPA took several administrative actions on the original
power contracts to clarify contract length and identify
geographical distribution of power and energy. In December,
1985, WAPA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) on the Revised
Proposed General Power Marketing Criteria and Allocation Criteria 
for the Salt Lake City Area which covers the hydroelectricity
produced at Glen Canyon Dam.
c. WAPA was challenged on the proposed post 1989 power
marketing criteria by several power entities.	 The lead claimant,
Utah Power & Light (UP&L) challenged priority of the contracts in
court and eventually negotiated a settlement with WAPA in 1988.
However, four environmental friends of the court then entered the
process to sue on the same issues. After considerable delibera-
tion, Judge Green of the U.S. District Court in Salt Lake City
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issued a ruling on September 29, 1989 which directed WAPA to
initiate an EIS on the post 1989 power marketing criteria.
d. On April 4, 1990, WAPA announced it would prepare an
EIS on its post 1989 marketing criteria for the ten powerplants in
the CRSP, including Glen Canyon Dam. Its EIS would be separate
from but coordinated with the Glen Canyon Dam EIS.
e. The scope of WAPA's EIS expanded after its scoping
meetings produced over 22,000 comments from the public. It was
renamed the SLCA/IP Electric Power Marketing EIS (Salt Lake City
Area/Integrated Projects) and its scope was broadened from the
original scope of assessing the Post-1989 Marketing and Allocation
Criteria for firm electric power sales to include other power
r-N
	
	 marketing programs and other power related programs. WAPA's
Electric Power Marketing EIS Update for the Salt Lake City Area
Integrated Projects (SLCA/IP) newsletter of April, 1991, notes
that it "...will assess the impacts of each aspect of its SLCA/IP
electric power marketing programs and of the resultant dam
operations for hydropower generation (i.e., powerplant operations)
in particular those impacts on the affected human environment and
the natural environment downstream from all applicable SLCA/IP
hydropower generation facilities."
f. WAPA has at this writing tentatively selected three
cooperators: BR, FWS and NPS. With expanded scope, others are
likely to be included, such as AZG&F, BIA, selected tribes. A
group of coordinating agencies may also be established, includingr-N	 EPA, Regional Environmental Office, DO!, and others. Since ten
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dams are covered, the geographic scope is considerably broader and
the list of cooperators and coordinators is likely to expand
exponentially.
X.	 Relationship Between BR and WAPA EISs
a. WAPA and BR are lead agencies on EISs and cooperators on
each other's EIS. As GCES proceeds, changes in dam operations are
being made, both for research flows, and at the completion of
research flows, in interim flows, to operate the dam until the
Department of the Interior's EIS is completed and a Record of
Decision is issued.
b. Reclamation determines annual flow release volume from
Glen Canyon Dam, defines minimum and maximum flow rates, and
maintains the powerplant. 	 "Th
c. WAPA utilizes the water resource provided at Glen Canyon
Dam and defines the generation of power within the general
boundaries set by Reclamation and by the contracts. WAPA controls
the electrical output of the generators and consequently the
actual flow release at Glen Canyon Dam. The generator operation
is driven by contract requirements and the price of power.
d. The GOES results, which form the technical and scien-
tific data in the Department's EIS, have found that the high
ramping rates and low flows associated with WAPA's operation of
the dam are causing significant environmental harm downstream, and
the dam itself has also caused impacts. The dam's impacts include
silt-free water being released downstream, lower temperature
water, and a modification of the water quality of the Colorado
	 cm
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River. The initial clearing of water and increased nutrients
allowed for a trout fishery to be established.
e. Scientifically based flows have been identified that
would reduce the ramping rates and increase minimum flows which
would stabilize the damaged environment and allow ecosystem
recovery. These flows would reduce the capacity and timing of the
power Glen Canyon Dam could generate to meet WAPA's contracts.
f. The marketing criteria WAPA implements •is dependent on
the amount of power (capacity and energy) it has to sell. Less
capacity and modified energy production from Glen Canyon Dam would
result in WAPA's perhaps having to either adjust its contracts,
and definitely having to renew contracts under different terms, or
WAPA would have to purchase power from other sources to meet its
contracts.
g. The timing of these two EISs is problematic. The Glen
Canyon Dam EIS is proving to be considerably more complex than
first expected, and the scope has expanded defacto from the
original boundaries of the dam to Lake Mead. The scope has moved
to include looking at impacts to both Lake Mead and Lake Powell.
Its timeframe has likewise extended.
h. The SLCA/IP Electric Power Marketing EIS has suffered
setbacks in timely completion, as changes to operations of the dam
are made and the public has shown considerably more interest in it
than was anticipated. The schedule released in April, 1991
suggests a Draft EIS will ' be released in April 1992 and a Record
of Decision (ROD) in May 1993.
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XI. National Academy of Sciences Role in Glen Canyon Environmen-
tal Studies 
a.	 Besides providing comments in its publication River and
Dam Management A Review of the Bureau of Reclamation's Glen Canyon
Studies in 1987, the Committee also held a Symposium on the
Colorado River Ecology and Dam Management in May, 1990 in Santa
Fe, NM. At this writing the proceedings are being published.
b.	 One of the recommendations of the original committee,
which finished its work and was succeeded by a second committee to
continue oversight of the process, was that a Senior Scientist be
hired by the Department to guide Phase II of the GCES. This was
partially accomplished, as Dr. Duncan Patten was recommended by
the Executive Review Committee and hired on a part time Inter-
governmental Personnel Agreement (IPA), through the Bureau of
Reclamation.
XII. Federal Regulatory Interests - Department of the  Interior
a. The Bureau of Reclamation, on behalf of the Secretary of
the Interior, regulates the waters of the Colorado River. While
there are many competing demands for the water resource, power
generation has assumed a predominant role. Sale of electricity,
at subsidized rates, pays for the facilities the taxpayers footed
the bills for, and natural resources (beaches, endangered species,
recreation safety, cultural artifacts, etc.) are paying a high
price.
b. The National Park Service, which manages the resources
in the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and the Grand Canyon 	 7-1
National Park, has had little say historically in how the waters
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of the Colorado River are used to benefit the recreational,
cultural, habitat and other resources they exercise trust respon-
sibility for on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. NPS
serves as a cooperator on both EISs, sits on the Glen Canyon Dam
EIS writing team and was a member of the Executive Review
Committee. Staff also participate in the GCES.
c. The Fish and Wildlife Service, which oversees the
recovery of endangered Humpback Chub has engaged in preparing a
Section 7 Biological Opinion on the operations of the dam for the
past several years. Since all agencies of the government have a
positive responsibility not to further endanger these species,
FWS's concerns have helped fuel the Glen Canyon Environmental
r-•	 Studies. FWS serves as a cooperator on both EISs, sits on the
Glen Canyon Dam EIS writing team, and was a member of the Execu-
tive Review Committee. Staff also participate in the GCES.
Fish, wildlife and their habitat are paying. Trout may be
benefitting, but the jury is still out.
d. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has been a cooperating
agency on the Glen Canyon Dam EIS. They may also become a
cooperating or coordinating agency on WAPA's EIS. Tribes who want
to participate contact BIA for technical assistance, and are
usually referred to the GCES. Since all agencies of the govern-
ment have a positive responsibility to uphold the Indian trust,
ETA's concerns have helped fuel GCES' involvement of tribal
interests.
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e. Indian tribes, six at last count, are participating in
the GCES, the Els writing team, and as cooperating agencies, to
one degree or another. Their cultural and archeological resources
are paying a price as water ramps up and down exposing artifacts
that were innundated.
f. U.S. Geological Survey has no management responsibility
and its role has been to participate in the GCES. It has recently
named staff to sit on the EIS writing team. GS' contribution to
the GCES is oriented toward long-term monitoring.
g. Office of Environmental Affairs, Regional Environmental
Office has participated in a coordinating role with the GCES, NAS
Committees, EIS, Executive Review Committee, Cooperating Agencies
Group, and Committee of Five. The Committee of Five is an ad hoc
group comprised of the Senior Scientist, the Manager of the GCES,
the Bureau's Regional Environmental Officer, BR's Manager of
Environmental Services, chaired by the Colorado River Studies
Manager. This group is charged with determining the actual
interim flows to be recommended to the Secretary of the Interior
for implementation in September 1991. The Office of the Solicitor
and the Department's Regional Environmental Officer also partici-
pate in these deliberations.
h. The Office of the Solicitor has been brought into the
deliberations of the Cooperating Agencies and Committee of Five as
legal issues arise and advice is needed.
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XIII.Federal Regulatory  Interests - Western Area Power
Administration
a. WAPA began its EIS in April, 1990, expanding its scope in
April, 1991. Its marketing of power depends upon how much energy
and capacity are available, from which sources, and when. How
WAPA does its job hinges on how the water is let through the
turbines of the dams. WAPA benefits as a power broker to its
clients Colorado River Energy Distributors Association (CREDA) and
others by contracting for and delivering below cost power. WAPA
and its clients benefit from generating maximum power through Glen
Canyon Dam.
b. WAPA is a cooperating agency, a member of the EIS
writing team, and a participant in the GCES, and was a member of
the Executive Review Committee. Any change in the status quo to
lessen the generation energy and capacity of Glen Canyon Dam is an
economic cost to WAPA and its clients. Already buying power to
meet its contracts about 50% of the time now, less power from Glen
Canyon Dam will require more and costlier purchases to meet
existing contracts.
c. Judge Green stipulated that WAPA should reopen its
contracts depending on the outcome of the EIS. WAPA is at this
writing reluctant to ask the Judge to open this window of oppor-
tunity to renegotiate its contracts based upon interim flows,
which the Secretary of the Interior, encouraged by proposed
C'	 legislation, committed to implement by August, 1991, when the
research flows conducted as part of the GCES, were completed.
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d. Interim flows would be in effect from August, 1991 to
whenever the Glen Canyon Dam EIS and Record of Decision are
finalized. Any such flows which result in less generation of
power would likely have beneficial impacts to downstream
resources, but would reduce WAPA's ability to generate power,
reducing its ability to fulfill its contracts, and forcing it to
buy power elsewhere. The change in the present balance of
economic cost and environmental protection has not as of this
writing been struck. Additional NEPA compliance for these
proposed interim flows has not yet been decided upon.
XIV. Federal Regulatory Interests - Environmental Protection
Agency
a. The EPA has two regions interested in the impacts to the
environment of the flows through Glen Canyon Dam. Region VIII,
headquartered in Denver, is interested in impacts to Lake Powell,
and the precedent being set for NEPA compliance on other dams up
and down the Colorado River.
b. Region IX, headquartered in San Francisco, is concerned
with impacts occurring downstream, which is geographically in
Region IX.
c. EPA has prepared Scoping comments on both EISs and has
arranged briefings by BR, NAPA, and some of the cooperating
agencies. EPA staff attend cooperating agency meetings, public
meetings, etc.
XV. Federal Requlatorv Interests - Other 
a.	 The Department of Justice has expressed interest in
these EISs opining that the Glen Canyon Dam EIS will be the
/Th
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occasion for "landmark environmental litigation". As the Federal
agency which will defend the Department of the Interior in court
when the all but inevitable lawsuits come, DOJ staff are attend-
ing meetings, on mailing lists, and trying to keep up.
b. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers works with EPA in granting
Section 404 permits. If a dam is constructed (per several
alternatives under consideration at this writing in the EIS) or a
sand slurry line installed, the Corps would be approached for a
Section 404 permit.
c. Congress has also expressed an interest in these issues.
Legislation introduced by Cong. George Miller (D-Martinez, CA) as
well as bills introduced by Senators Bill Bradley, (D-NY), Dennis
DeConcini (fl-AZ), John McCain (R-AZ), and Cong. John Rhodes
(R-AZ), stimulated the Secretary of the Interior to assert his .
jurisdiction over flows from Glen Canyon Dam and to commit to
interim flows when the research flows were completed. Hearings
held by Mr. Miller also induced activity leading to the progress
of the studies and the EIS.
XVI. Other Interested Parties 
a.	 The Law of the River mandates coordination between
Federal agencies and the seven basin states, and must take into
account the treaty requirements with Mexico. Arizona has had the
largest role in participating in the GCES and the EIS process of
the Bureau. They do not yet participate in WAPA's EIS, nor were
tbey included in the Executive Review Committee nor the NAS
("*\	
Committee liaison. Indeed, it took a visit from General Counsel
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of the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to
persuade Bureau of Reclamation to include Arizona Department of
Game and Fish (AZG&F) as cooperators. Despite repeated verbal and
written requests, BR was unwilling to include them, notwithstand-
ing they qualified under CEQ's guidelines. Dinah Bear, the
General Counsel, expressed to the Bureau and cooperators that she
had never in her entire career with CEQ heard of a lead agency
turning down a willing cooperator. That AZG&F has specific
management responsibility for a blue ribbon trout fishery within
the study area downstream of the dam, and had been cooperating in
the GCES gave strength to their demands, finally acceeded to, that
they are legitimate cooperators.
Th
b.	 Grand Canyon Trust, Sierra Club, Grand Canyon forties,
.Inc., Friends of the River, and several other environmental groups
have expressed their concerns to the Congress, the bureaus of the
Department of the Interior, EPA, WAPA, and the courts. Without
their input, the regulatory interests of these agencies directly
running the river would not have changed in the direction favored
by those with interests in the resources of the river. So far,
the changes have been very temporary research flows and much
study, funded by the revenues generated by Glen Canyon Dam. The
saga of interim flows is being written in real time.
XVII. Summar y : Who Benefits
a.	 From Bureau of Reclamation's standpoint, the benefits of
regulating Glen Canyon Dam lie in complying with the Law of the
	
(Th
River, supplying water to various users, running a "cash register"
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dam to repay costs, and most particularly working with WAPA to
produce inexpensive hydroelectric power, a source of considerable
political clout.
b. From WAPA's perspective, they have created a role of
Power Master not unlike BR's role as Water Master. They are power
brokers for the Western States and have created powerful allies in •
the utilities and other clients to whom they provide cheap,
plentiful power. The status quo, or even more power generation,
benefits WAPA and their clients.
c. From the utilities' perspective, low rates for hydro-
electric power are a definite benefit. They do not think of it as
welfare, or governmental subsidies, just good, cheap, reliable
npower.
d. From the ratepayers' perspectives, the power doesn't
seem cheap. When compared to rates in other parts of the country,
it clearly is, but, while seen as a benefit, it is only
appreciated when rates begin to climb.
e. From taxpayers' perspectives, there is benefit from Glen
Canyon paying back the Treasury for the money they authorized 35
years ago for the dams and other waterworks. Were the power being
sold at rates similar to other, nonsubsidized rates, more money
would be coming into the Treasury faster, and the benefit would be
greater.
f. From AZG&F's perspective, the benefit is cold, clear




XVIII. Summary: Who Pays
a. From National Park Service's perspective, the natural
and cultural resources they manage are being and have been damaged
by the way the water runs through the dam to generate power. GCES
findings have shown that beaches are degrading, ecosystems being
harmed, archeological resources are being lost, and recreation
safety is endangered by large ramping rates used to create
hydroelectricity.
b. From Fish and Wildlife Service's perspective, certain
native and endangered species have been extirpated and the
remaining endangered species are jeopardized by the operations of
the dam. Habitat is threatened by fluctuating waters, fish are
stranded, and other endangered species, such as golden eagles and
peregrine falcons, are disrupted when riparian vegetation is
	 Th
destroyed.
c. From AZG&F's perspective, water ramping strands trout
and causes problems managing the fishery.
d. From recreationists' perspectives, both professional and
amateur, beaches and camp sites are degraded and boats are
stranded and safety is impaired by fluctuating flows. Fishers
report water going up and coming down rapidly, interfering with
their fishing safety and their access by boat.
e. From Tribes' points of view, cultural and archeological
resources are being damaged and destroyed by fluctuating water
used to generate hydroelectricity. 	
rTh
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f. From environmentalists' points of view, the balance of
cost vs benefit is drawn too heavily in the power users' favor.
They see environmental damages to irreplaceable resources and have
sued and lobbied to force interim flows to stablize loss of
resources, and for the GCES and EIS results to show what flows
need to be put in place to reverse the damage, notwithstanding a
reduction in power generation.
g. From the perspective of Congressional members who have
introduced legislation, the balance of cost vs benefit needs to be
shifted to favor the resources of the Grand Canyon and Glen Canyon
National Park and National Recreation Area. The resulting cost to
(0-N	 power generators and users will reduce their subsidies of the
past 35 years.
h. From EPA's perspective, environmental degradation is
occurring and needs to be mitigated. The environnment is paying
the heaviest cost for cheap power.
XIX. Who Decides
a.	 From the Department of the Interior's perspective, the
Bureau of Reclamation has always acted as the Water Master on
behalf of the Secretary, making the decisions. It is felt that
other bureaus which have traditionally not had any say in how the
river is managed are now being heard on behalf of their natural
and cultural resources. This is a shift of power in the Depart-
ment, and is coming neither quickly nor easily. The jury is out
rm-N	 on exactly who in the Department of the Interior will decide.
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What is new is that FWS, NPS and their constituencies now have a
seat at the table and a chance to be dealt some cards.
b. From the Western Area Power Administration's perspec-
tive, their monopoly on water releases to generate power no
questions asked is shifting. Their former home base and long time
ally, BR is being forced to share power within the Department.
Any change to benefit the resources is seen by WAPA as a cost.
Whether they will bargain in good faith, find a win/win position
for themselves and their clients, or will gracefully accept other
priorities as equal to theirs, remains to be seen. One indication
is their most recent newsletter announcing the change in scope of
their EIS. While a broadening of scope is a major step in the
right direction, the newsletter was mailed April 26 and announced 	 /—\
public meetings to be held May 6, 7 and 9. This attitude toward
public involvement is one step back.
c. From National Park Service's and Fish and Wildlife
Service's perspectives, their management roles on behalf of
natural and cultural resources are finally being given long
overdue recognition. With a new Assistant Secretary for Fish,
Wildlife and Parks within the Department, these bureaus may
finally have a role in who decides.
d. From Bureau of Indian Affairs' standpoint, four of the
tribes are finally being offered a voice at the table. Indian
>
trust responsibilities are being looked at in connection with
operating the dam for the first time.
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e. From the perspective of the Tribes, they for the first
time have a say in the impacts of the dam to their resources. How
they use this opportunity remains to be seen.
f. From EPA's perspective, who decides appears to be
shifting from environmental resources subsidizing cheap power to
less power generation to stabilize environmental damage. Manage-
ment of the flows to create power as an incidental use of the
water resource may be in the offing.
g. From those interested Congressmen, they see the roles of
the Bureau and WAPA giving way, albeit with all deliberate speed.
h. From the environmental groups' perspective, there is
movement pulling toward a balance more favoring natural and
cultural resources. They remain skeptical as to how far the
pendulum will swing, and in what time frame.
i. From the Western ratepayers' perspectives, rate changes
are coming and that is not good news. It will depend on how well
they are educated by the media, their representatives in Congress,
and environmental groups what their reaction will be to paying
slightly more for power so that the resources of the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area and Grand Canyon National Park will not
be lost to this and future generations.
j. From the perspective of the NAS Committee, there are
both environmental costs and scientific benefits. It sees an
opportunity to utilize the science in the adaptive management of
the Colorado River. In addition, the Academy sees a larger
25
potential in using the CCES effort as a prototype for riverine
ecosystem management in other national and international river
systems.
k.	 And finally, from the citizens' perspectives, the GCES
and the preservation of resources in the Grand Canyon, both from
the ravages of ramped water through Glen Canyon Dam to the
uncontrolled sulphur dioxide emissions from Navajo Generating
Station, are of national and international interest, unfolding in
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of the dam and Lake Powell, it is necessary to
distinguish between short-term and long-term
operations. Both are ultimately related, but the
failure to distinguish between the two, as
exemplified by the Glen Canyon Environmental
Study's evaluation of the law and the operation of
the dam, may overstate to a significant degree the
legal constraints under which the bureau operates.
The classic Law of the River is a law of mass
allocations between the upper and lower basins, the
United States, and Mexico, and among the seven
basin states and Indian tribes, supplemented by
national and international water quality and
environmental quality legislation. This law has
very little to do with the day-to-day operations of
the dam. Beyond ensuring that Lake Powell is
filled by July 1 of each year, the bureau has not
had to operate the dam to allocate water in
response to a long-term shortage on which the
classic law is premised. Instead, the bureau
operates the dam on a daily basis to maximize power
revenues to repay the costs of the dam and
reclamation projects in the upper basin. The duty
to comply with the law of mass allocations could
constrain the daily and monthly operations of the
dam, but it is important to realize that to date
the bureau has been able to operate the dam within
the broadest parameters of the common understanding
of the Law of the River. A brief review of the law
of mass allocation is necessary for the reader to
evaluate the constraints to which the bureau is
subject and to understand the deficiencies of the
component of the GCES report on dam operations.
1. 1922 Colorado River Compact. In 1922 the
lower and upper basin states agreed to a mass
allocation between the two basins, with a
contingency for the satisfaction of Mexican
claims. The upper basin states (Wyoming, Utah,
Colorado, New Mexico) agreed to the compact to
reserve water for their future use that they feared
would be lost to the more rapidly developing lower
basin states (Nevada, Arizona, California),
especially California. The upper basin states
correctly anticipated that the Supreme Court would
apply the law of prior appropriation in equitable
apportionment actions between states that follow
the doctrine. The lower basin states consented to
a limitation on their right to continue to
appropriate Colorado River water in order to obtain
federal construction of Boulder Dam.
2. 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act. Congress
appropriated money to construct Boulder Dam and
required California to limit its use to 4.4 million
acre feet of the lower basin's allotment, which set
a limitation for Arizona since Nevada has
consistently claimed only 300,000 acre feet.
3. 1948 Mexican Water Treaty. The United States
agreed to provide Mexico with 1.5 million acre feet
per year. Questions about the quality of the water
were deferred until the 1970s.
4. 1948 Uover §asin Compact. The upper basin
states agreed to a percentage allocation among
themselves of the amount reserved by the 1922
Compact. They did this because the Bureau of
Reclamation told them that it would not recommend
any reclamation projects in the upper basin until
each state had a firm entitlement.
5. 1963-1964 Sunrspe Court decision in Arizona
v. California. To the surprise of the basin
states, the Supreme Court held that (1) the 1928
limitation on California's use was a congressional
exercise of its power under the commerce clause to
apportionment of the river among Arizona,
California, and Nevada, (2) the Secretary of the
Interior has the discretion to apportion water in
times of shortage incident to administration of
reclamation contracts by whatever formula is
chosen, and (3) Indian reservations and federal
reservations of public lands may claim federal
reserved water rights to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation. The result was that Arizona got the
firm water right it needed to seek federal funding
of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which has now
been completed to Phoenix. The net effect of
Arizona v. California was to make the Secretary of
-
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the Interior the River Master and to provide Indian
tribes some measure of water parity with
agricultural and municipal users.
6. 1968 Colorado River Project ggg. This act
authorized the Central Arizona Project and
partially reversed Arizona v. California because
Arizona agreed to subordinate CAP deliveries to 4.4
million acre feet of existing California uses as
well as to all present perfected rights in Arizona
and Nevada. These are the senior rights around
Yuma and the Imperial Valley and the five Colorado
River tribes.
7. 3.972 and 1977 Clean Water Acts. Reduction of
salinity levels became a national commitment.
8. 1973 Endangered Svecies Act. This federal
legislation requires that federal projects be
operated to protect listed threatened or endangered
species jeopardized by the project. The
relationship between flow releases required to
comply with the act and prior state and federal
allocations is unclear.
There is a potential conflict between use of the
dam and reservoir for power generation and use for
carryover storage to meet the various mass
allocation duties. For example, suppose the upper
basin demands that water be stored to meet its
future 10-year average delivery obligation but
instead the Secretary of the Interior releases
water to meet power contracts? A 1964 secretarial
decision to release Lake Powell water, while the
reservoir was filling, was protested by the upper
basin states. The resulting controversy led to the
formulation of operating criteria of lakes Mead and
Powell that were enacted into law in 1968. The
relevant text of the statute provides:
In order to comply with and carry out the
provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and the
Mexican Water Treaty, the Secretary shall propose
criteria for the coordinated long-range operation
of the reservoirs constructed and operated under
the authority of the Colorado River Storage
Project Act (43 USCA §620 et seq.), the
Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 USCA §617 et
seq.), and the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment
Act [43 USCA §618 et seq.]. To effect in
part the purposes expressed in this paragraph,
the criteria shall make provision for the storage
of water in storage units of the Colorado River
storage project and releases of water from Lake
Powell in the following listed order of priority:
(1) releases to supply one-half the deficiency
described in article III(c) of the Colorado River
Compact, if any such deficiency exists and is
chargeable to the states of the Upper Division,
but in any event such releases, if any, shall not
be required in any year that the Secretary makes
the determination and issues the proclamation
specified in section 1512 of this title;
(2) releases to comply with article III(d) of
the Colorado River Compact, less such quantities
of water delivered into the Colorado River below
Lee's Ferry to the credit of the states of the
Upper Division from other sources; and
(3) storage of water not required for the
releases specified in clauses (1) and (2) of this
subsection to the extent that the Secretary,
after consultation with the Upper Colorado River
Commission and representatives of the three Lower
Division States and taking into consideration all
relevant factors (including, but not limited to
historic streamflows, the most critical period of
record, and probabilities of water supply), shall
find to be reasonably necessary to assure
'dediveries under clauses (1) and (2) without
impairment of annual consumptive uses In the
upper basin pursuant to the Colorado River
Compact: provided, that water not so required to
be stored shall be released from Lake Powell:
(I) to the extent It can be reasonably applied in
the states of the Lower Division to the uses
specified in article III(e) of the Colorado River
Compact, but no such releases shall be made when











the active storage In Lake Mead, (It) to
maintain, as nearly as practicable, active
storage in Lake Mead equal to the active storage
in Lake Powell, and (III) to avoid anticipated
spills from Lake Powell.
This statute tracks the Law of the River. The
salient portions incorporated into the statute are
the two compacts and prior congressional
legislation. The 1922 Colorado River Compact
divides the basin between upper and lower states
and awards each basin 7.5 million acre feet
annually and gives the lower basin the right to
increase its uses another 1 million acre feet. The
1948 compact apportions the upper basin's 7.5
million acre feet on a percentage basis among the
four upper basin states. The 1948 Mexican Water
Treaty guarantees Mexico 1.5 million acre feet per
year; the burden is to be borne equally by the two
basins if surplus water is not available. The
Boulder Canyon Project authorized the construction
of Hoover Dam, and authorized Arizona, California,
and Nevada to enter into a compact to divide the
lower basin such that they would receive 2,800,000;
400,000; and 300,000 acre feet, respectively. No
such interstate compact was made, but in Arizona v.
California the Supreme Court construed the act to
be a congressional apportionment of the lower
basin. Article III(c) of the 1922 compact requires
that the upper basin states contribute one-half of
the Mexican Treaty obligation, but section 1512
recognizes that the Mexican Treaty obligation is a
national one and the upper basin states are
relieved of their III(c) duties if the Secretary of
the Interior finds that augmented supplies of the
Colorado system are available to meet the
obligation. In 1968 Senator Jackson successfully
sponsored an amendment that prohibited the Bureau
of Reclamation from studying augmentation plans for
any river system outside the seven basin states,
e.g., the Columbia, for 10 years. Article III(d)
requires the upper basin states not to cause an
aggregate depletion in the river at Lee's Ferry
below 75 million acre feet for any 10-year
consecutive period "reached in continuing
progressive series beginning with the first day of
October next succeeding the ratification of this
compact." Article III(e) prohibits the upper basin
states from withholding water and the lower basin
states from requiring the delivery of water that
cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and
agricultural uses. There is no mention of power
generation in the section.
INITIATION OF THE GLEN CANYON
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
The physical boundaries of the Glen Canyon
Environmental Studies (GCES) extended from Glen
Canyon Dam through the Grand Canyon to Lake Mead
(Figure 1.2). These boundaries were specified in
Commissioner Broadbent's December 6, 1982,
memorandum (see Appendix B-2). The study boundary
was the Colorado River reach between Lake Powell
and Lake Mead, excluding both reservoirs (Figure
1.1).
The Glen Canyon Environmental Studies have their
roots in court decisions and public involvement.
When it became apparent that operation of the
rebuilt turbines in Glen Canyon Dam could increase
the fluctuations of water levels downstream in the
Grand Canyon, tour operators offering white-water
raft trips through the canyon became concerned
about the continuing quality and safety of their
excursions. Private citizens and environmental
preservation organizations were also concerned
about the continued vitality of ecosystems in the
Grand Canyon that might be subject to alteration by
the fluctuations in flow.
In association with several groups, one tour
operator, Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc., brought suit
against Ronald H. Walker, Director of the National
Park Service, and other DOI officials in an attempt
to prevent the extreme fluctuations in water levels
(Grand Canyon Dorries. Inc.. et al. v.Ronald H. 
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